Veganism as an Aspiration

    One tension that stood out to me in Lori Gruen and Robert C. Jones’s "Veganism as an Aspiration" is the uneasy relationship between the idea that animals have equal moral worth and the reality that animals themselves often cause harm to one another. Gruen and Jones advocate for veganism not as a rigid rule, but as an aspirational practice — a way of striving to minimize the suffering we cause to other sentient beings. They argue that recognizing animals as moral equals obliges us to change our eating and consumption habits, even if doing so is difficult and imperfect.

    However, this idea becomes complicated when we reflect on the fact that nonhuman animals regularly harm and kill each other in nature. If animals, too, are moral equals, does their causing of suffering undermine the claim that we are obligated to avoid causing any suffering? It seems hypocritical to expect humans to uphold an absolute principle of nonviolence when those we are morally elevating do not live by it themselves.

    Gruen and Jones seem aware of this challenge, though they don't directly frame it as hypocrisy. Instead, they stress that humans, because of our cognitive capacities and cultural institutions, are uniquely positioned to make moral choices that other animals cannot. Our responsibility comes not from a claim that we are "better" than animals but from our ability to recognize suffering and to adjust our behaviors accordingly. Still, this leaves a lingering discomfort: if suffering is so deeply woven into the fabric of life itself, how realistic or meaningful is it to frame veganism as an ethical ideal?

    Ultimately, I find Gruen and Jones’s view compelling but complicated. The aspiration to reduce suffering is worthwhile, but it sits uneasily with the reality that suffering — including that caused by animals — is an unavoidable part of life.

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